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Abstract: Roughly during the last decade, European Competition Policy has under-
gone a series of fundamental changes. All four areas – cartel policy, merger policy, 
abuse control, and state aid control – have been subject to a modernization proc-
ess, which led to a focus on analysing the effects of individual cases and estab-
lished a tendency towards deciding each case on its individual merits. These 
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changes can be understood as a move away from rule-based competition policy 
towards a case-by-case approach. The case-by-case approach especially includes 
consensual arrangements, so-called ‘deals’ between the competition authority and 
business companies. Therefore, this paper will discuss the pros and cons of ‘deals’ 
as an instrument of (European) competition policy. The paper’s central focus lies on 
the economic analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of using consensual 
arrangements as a relevant instrument of European competition policy. With re-
spect to European competition policy, we conclude that we need to issue a note of 
caution. From an economic perspective, an expansion of consensual elements nec-
essarily walks hand in hand with a continual weakening of the protection of com-
petition. Consumer welfare will not benefit from expanding the role and im-
portance of consensual arrangements as a means of European competition policy. 
 
Keywords: European competition policy, consensual arrangements, antitrust set-
tlements, merger control, deals, political economics 
JEL-Codes: L40, K21, D02, P16 
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Antitrust Parable (2) – The Kroes and The Almunia 
The Kroes. The Kroes’ job was to catch as many fish as possible, and the bigger the 
better. Every fish she caught she showed it off and was very proud. When she 
caught a really big fish the press would report in wonderment about Kroes’s great 
prowess. If another NCA got a bigger fish, she was embarrassed and immediately 
went after a fish that was even bigger. Smaller fishes she threw back because she 
wanted more fish. She saw to it that there were plenty of places for fish to breed 
and plenty of sources of food for them. Anything that prevented the fish from 
thriving and multiplying she opposed, because she wanted more and bigger fish. 
The Almunia. The Almunia hated cases and wanted only to protect the business. He 
did not want to catch cases, but caught any he discovered. But he also encouraged 
staff to scare away cases [settlement?]. He sealed up the holes where cases could 
hide. He looked for any technique anywhere that would scare away cases [press 
releases, speeches, RFI...]. If something worked against having cases, he used it. If 
he caught a case he apologized to the townspeople because one had gotten 
through. He did everything he could so there would be no cases now or in the fu-
ture. He wanted to protect the grain for the townspeople. 
(http://chillingcompetition.com/2012/06/14/antitrust-parable-2-the-kroes-and-the-
almunia/; 16.08.2012; 14.34) 
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1. From Rule-Based Antitrust to Consensual Arrangements? 
Roughly during the last decade, European Competition Policy has undergone a se-
ries of fundamental changes. All four areas – cartel policy, merger policy, abuse 
control, and state aid control – have been subject to a modernization process, put-
ting more focus on analysing the effects of individual cases and establishing a ten-
dency towards deciding each case on its individual merits (so-called effects based 
approach instead of the previous form or rule based approach).1 The interrelations 
of the European Commission’s (EC) enforcement activities both with the member 
states competition policies (European Competition Network; Budzinski 2006) and 
with other countries’ antitrust systems (International Competition Network; Budzin-
ski 2004, 2012) have been substantially re-shaped and redesigned, emphasizing 
cooperative and consensual arrangements among competition law enforcers. Even 
the underlying constitution of European competition policy has experienced change 
in the course of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (in operation since 1 De-
cember 2009), which ‘only’ speaks of “establishing of the competition rules neces-
sary for the functioning of the internal market” (Art. 3 (1) TFEU) instead of the pre-
vious phrasing which insisted upon a “system ensuring that competition in the in-
ternal market is not distorted” (Art. 3 (1) EC). It is the opinion of many commenta-
tors that the instrumental character of competition has been punctuated within the 
European economic system, eroding or depreciating any priority of the protection 
of competition in comparison to both non-competition community goals as well as 
alternative and conflicting instruments (inter alia, Riley 2007). 
With the new commission taking office in February 2010, the role of competition 
appears to be subject to further change, continuing the previous trends. For in-
stance, in the “Europe 2020” Strategy of the new commission, competition policy 
does not play an explicit role – even though the new leaders of the competition 
commission emphasise that competition takes or should take a ‘cross-cutting’ func-
tion regarding alternative goals and aims (Almunia 2010a; Italianer 2010a). How-
ever, other programmatic statements of the commissioner and his general director 
have further fuelled the impression that competition may have to make way for 
other policies in case of conflicting goals, for instance for industrial policy regaining 
strength. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, for instance, writes with an eye to 
programmatic remarks by the general director of the competition commission, 
Alexander Italianer: “The European Commission aims at adjusting its competitive 
politics towards a new industrial policy and other political aims. […] This new point 
of view, including that competition is used instrumentally to achieve other eco-
nomic political aims, corresponds to the Lisbon Treaty, in which competition is 
merely mentioned as a means to realise the internal market. The internal market’s 

1 See, emphasizing the advantages, Röller 2005, Röller & de la Mano 2006, Neven & de la Mano 
2009, as well as, rather critical, Schmidt & Voigt 2008, Christiansen 2010, Budzinski 2011a. 

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goals are qualified through aims which require governmental intervention, which 
includes social progress, social justice, environmental quality and cohesion.”2 
Corresponding are various statements by the new European Commissioner for 
Competition, Joaquín Almunia, such as “[the] goal […] is to give Europe a modern 
industrial policy built on EU competition rules” (Almunia 2010b: 6) or “[my] goal is 
finding a balance between protecting consumer welfare and creating the right 
conditions for business in Europe to grow to the scale needed to take on global 
competitors” (Almunia 2010c: 7). It becomes clear that the protection of competi-
tion via the consumer welfare standard is no longer the ultimate aim of the com-
mission. Instead, the Almunia Commission appears to be open for considering 
trade-offs between competition and other objectives, for instance, in an industrial 
policy context – without prejudice or a strong a priori competition presumption. 
For instance, environmental protection measures, such as the reduction of carbon 
dioxide emissions, emerge as a justification for the approval of state aid as long as 
competition is not excessively distorted (‘green defense’; ArcelorMittal Case (T-
399/10) 2010). However, one must not ignore that at least Brussels Competition 
Commission considers the realization of the Lisbon targets and “Europe 2020” only 
possible on the basis of a functioning competitive order. “Competition is an in-
strument, not an end in itself. But it is indeed a vital instrument in very many re-
spects. Without fair, robust, and effective competition policy and enforcement, I 
don’t see how we Europeans […] shape up to compete with the other, dynamic 
players that are increasingly present on the world scene. Of course, competition is 
not the only tool we should use to pursue this goal” (Almunia 2011: 7). Hence, 
competition is seen as an important but certainly not as the only or the primary 
instrument. The priority is given to other aims: “[Our] priority number one is to help 
increase our competiveness in the world, our growth potential and the ability of 
our economies to create jobs […]” (Almunia 2011: 2). On the other hand, the chief 
guardian of competition points out that this aim can be first and foremost achieved 
by competition: “Competition policy will make a substantial contribution to this, by 
encouraging companies to compete on the merits and innovate, which they are 
more likely to do if they operate in a sound and undistorted environment” (ibid.). 
From an institutional economic point of view, these programmatic comments along 
with the longer-run change dynamics in European competition policy can be un-
derstood to move away from a rule-based competition policy towards a case-by-
case approach. 
A rule-based commercial policy, rooted in strong institutions, typically pursues only 
one clearly defined goal such as stability of the monetary value (absence of infla-

2 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 10, 2010, p. 11; translated by the authors. 
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tion) or consumer welfare.3 By doing so, it does not allow much scope for the po-
litical decision-makers to introduce other goals and (vested) interests. A more inter-
ventionist economic policy deciding individual cases on a case-by-case approach, 
associated with weak institutions, enables political decision-makers to consider 
case-specific ‘peculiarities’ and exceptional circumstances – but also to inject vested 
interests and tactical manoeuvres. Furthermore, the scope offered by a case-by-case 
approach includes scope for deals between the political and administrative deci-
sion-makers and the norm addressees. Thus, moving competition policy away from 
a rule-based and towards a case-by-case approach enhances the scope for employ-
ing the policy instrument ‘consensual arrangements’, so-called ‘deals’ between the 
competition authority (enforcing competition rules) and business companies (that 
are subject to competition rules).4 Any consensual arrangement requires the parties 
to the deal to consider the other parties’ interest to a sufficient extent; all partners 
to the deal must benefit from the deal. 
Thinking about rules meant to protect competition against anticompetitive prac-
tices and arrangements from business companies, a policy by deals does not repre-
sent an obviously advantageous or logical approach due to the fundamental con-
flict of interests between the enforcers and the norm addressees. Yet, the EC ap-
pear to be embracing this concept to an increasing extent. Therefore, this paper 
will discuss the pros and cons regarding the employment of consensual arrange-
ments as an instrument of (European) competition policy.5 
While at least the gradual shift from a rule-based to a case-by-case approach in the 
context of the so-called ‘effects based approach’ is arguably undoubted, there is a 
lack of empirical evidence concerning the increasing number of ‘deals’. Unfortu-
nately, this paper cannot close this gap either due to a lack of comprehensive data. 
However, in the second section we trace indication and case examples demonstrat-
ing that deals represent a relevant policy instrument and that its importance has 
increased recently. 
The paper’s central focus, however, lies on the economic analysis of the advantages 
and disadvantages of using consensual arrangements as a relevant instrument of 
European competition policy. Irrespective of whether the reader believes in the in-
dication that we trace in section 2, we offer scientific ammunition to contribute to 
the discussion of the future direction of European competition policy (section 3). 

3 The fundamental discussion whether consumer welfare represents the appropriate goal or con-
cepts like total welfare, protection of the competitive process, or competition liberty (etc.) will 
not be considered in this paper. But see, for instance and inter alia, Hellwig 2006, Budzinski 
2008, Vanberg 2011, and, Werden 2011. 
4 Compare a similar understanding of deals, but with a different focus Davidoff & Zaring 2009. 
Deals can either be initiated by the competitive authorities or by the companies. 
5 See also Budzinski & Kuchinke 2011. 

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Eventually, we conclude with a warning against extending the employment of con-
sensual arrangements and deals in competition policy (section 4). 
 
2. In Search for Evidence: Indication of a Trend towards Consensual Ar-
rangements? 
2.1. Assessments and Statements 
Traces of an increasing importance of deals in European competition policy can be 
detected in all the classical areas of competition policy – namely, cartel policy, mer-
ger control and abuse control. In the cartel policy area, for instance, the EC increas-
ingly focuses on so-called settlements, i.e., on consensual agreements with the 
(confessed or convicted) cartel members (Dekeyser & Roques 2010; Wils 2010; 
Holmes & Girardet 2011).6 Through bilateral consultations in the aftermath of the 
detection of a cartel, a common view of the facts of the case between the EC and 
the cartel members is sought to be established. The goal is that the guilty compa-
nies acknowledge the facts of the case and, conversely, the EC grants a ten per cent 
discount on the cartel fine. By acknowledging the facts of the case, the cartel 
members de facto refrain from an appeal against the EC’s decision. Even though 
the right to appeal remains intact de jure, the written acknowledgement of being 
guilty of the cartel accusations as the EC has established them would significantly 
harm any chances of a successful appeal procedure. The general director of the EC’s 
competition directorate Italianer (2010b: 3) euphorically reports first applications of 
the settlement instrument: “As you will have seen, the Commission yesterday 
reached its first settlement in the DRAM cartel case. This is a milestone in our en-
forcement against cartels. Settlement procedures allow the Commission to speed 
up investigations, free up resources to deal with other cases and therefore improve 
the efficiency of our cartel enforcement. This first settlement case has proved that 
the Commission was serious about using this procedure. It also proved that we 
gained trust from the companies willing to settle, which is a positive sign for the 
future.” Commissioner Almunia (2010c: 4) adds: “As to settlements, of the five car-
tel decisions adopted in the past months, we’ve already used this new instrument 
twice; in the DRAMs and Animal Feed cases. The DRAMs case – in which ten com-
panies were fined 330 million Euros, including a 10 per cent reduction for settling – 
was a milestone. The benefits of settling were immediately apparent: there have 
been no appeals – which in standard procedures can last for years – and our inves-
tigations gave rise to a ripple effect of leniency applications in related sectors. The 

6 The so-called ‘settlement package’ consists of three documents: first Regulation 622/2008, which 
changes Regulation 773/2004 and formally introduces the settlement instrument (Art. 10a), se-
cond the ‘settlement notice’, which interprets the new regulation, and thirdly an informal memo-
randum, which gives further interpretations and hints concerning the courses of the procedure 
(Dekeyser & Roques 2010: 825). 
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other settlement case to date – Animal Feed Phosphates – was also a success. We 
discovered and fined a cartel – a classical market-sharing and price-fixing arrange-
ment – which had run for over thirty years. Although not all the parties settled – we 
call this a hybrid settlement case –, the procedure proved to be highly efficient, in-
cluding the fact that we expect only one appeal.” The use of such consensual ar-
rangements is optional for all parties involved (otherwise, the standard procedure 
applies) and is supposed to, if possible, include all cartel members who are involved 
in a given case (Dekeyser & Roques 2010). 
For the EC, the main goal of the settlement instrument is the prevention of expen-
sive appeal proceedings against cartel decisions since approximately 90 per cent of 
the cartel sentences imposed by the EC have been contested in the past (Dekeyser 
& Roques 2010: 820-821). The principal content of the consensual arrangement 
between the cartel members and the EC is the volume of the monetary cartel fine 
(Dekeyser & Roques 2010: 829). Dekeyser and Roques (2010: 824-825) highlight 
the complementarity of this new instrument with the existing leniency programs, 
offering considerable penalty discounts for companies that help to detect and pro-
vide evidence against illegal cartels. The settlement arrangements, however, are not 
restricted to principal witness companies. Instead, they are open to all cartel mem-
bers. This ‘deal policy’ is supposed to be increasingly applied in the future.7 
According to recent statements by the EU Competition Commissioner, consensual 
arrangements of this type will not be restricted to sanctioning hard core cartels in 
the future. Instead, ‘commitments & settlements’, submitted or suggested by or 
cooperatively developed in close cooperation with the competition rules-violating 
companies, are desired to represent a major instrument for all types of antitrust 
offenses including the abuse of market power (the whole range of Art. 101 and 
102 TFEU; Almunia 2010c; 2012). So-called Art. 9 commitment decisions (Art. 9 
Regulation 1/2003) introduce the option for the EC to replace an infringement de-
cision (Art. 7 Regulation 1/2003) on anticompetitive concerns against non-hardcore 
cartels and abusive strategies by dominant companies by a commitment decision 
(Edwards & Padilla 2010; Schweitzer 2010). The EC is entitled to accept commit-
ments offered by the infringing companies – which may represent the outcome of 
commitment negotiations between the EC and the companies – and settle the case. 
Art. 9 type of decisions are used with an increasing frequency by the EC (Cavicchi 
2011: 4). Almunia (2010c: 5) also emphasizes that the EC increasingly places value 
on cooperative monitoring of the agreed-upon arrangements and commitments. In 
this regard, Almunia points to the cases of Svenska Kraftnet, EDF, EONgas and ENI 

7 “In 2010 – and for the first time – we have also taken two settlement decisions in the DRAMs 
and Animal Feed cases, saving a great deal of time and money. We are discussing settlements in 
a number of other cases, which shows that the new tool works well and is becoming a practical 
option to handle cartel cases” (Almunia 2011: 3). 

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in the energy sector as well as to the case of the Oneworld Alliance of major airlines 
(inter alia, British Airways, American Airlines and Iberia). 
Furthermore, and with reference to European merger control, Almunia emphasizes 
the close cooperation with the merging companies to find (consensual?) solutions 
for all kinds of competition concerns that may occur during the merger control 
procedure – with the important common goal not to jeopardize the merger project 
as such. “Where a potential merger raises competition problems, the Commission 
works very closely with the parties to find a solution” (Almunia 2010a: 5). “Over 
time, we have come to develop a productive relationship with the business com-
munity and prospective merging parties in particular, which yields positive and 
concrete results for both sides and for consumers. […] This productive dialogue 
between competition enforcers and the business community has also generated a 
broader preventive effect” (Almunia 2010b: 4). 
 
2.2. Data 
Since the application of deals within the framework of competition policy already is 
a longer-lasting tendency, some more indications can be derived from descriptive 
case statistics. In principle, the EC has three ways of intervention to prevent mer-
ger-induced anticompetitive effects: (i) prohibition, (ii) approval with obligations 
after an extensive investigation and analysis of the case, and (iii) approval with 
commitments after a brief (‘quick-look’) analysis within one month.8 (i) and (ii) are 
so-called phase II proceedings whereas (iii) belongs to phase I proceedings. Com-
mitments and obligations can both be structural means, such as de-investments, 
and behavioral consents. 
Taking a first look at the present data, it can be seen that the pro rata case num-
bers for (i) and (ii) have decreased during the last decade whereas they have re-
mained roughly constant for (iii).9 This development and particularly the dramati-
cally decreasing number of prohibition cases10 might point towards an increasingly 

8 It is also possible that the threat of a prohibition or prohibitive obligations causes a withdrawal 
of the merger project by the companies. However, there can be several other reasons to with-
draw a merger notification during the control procedure, such as the failure of the merging par-
ties to reach a final agreement on the merger conditions (note that notification to the EC must 
be done very early in the merging process), the lacking approval of the shareholders during the 
general assembly or the resistance of certain stakeholder groups. Since we cannot disentangle 
these very different withdrawal motivations, the number of withdrawals will not be counted in 
the merger control interventions of the EC in this paper. 
9 See appendices 1-3. Decision type (iii) may also have started a decreasing tendency in 2011.  
10 The 2011 prohibition of the proposed merger between Aegean Airlines and Olympic Air was the 
first one since 2007 (Ryanair/Aer Lingus). It was followed by the prohibition of Deutsche 
Börse/NYSE Euronext in 2012. 
10

permissive merger control (Maier-Rigaud & Parplies 2009; Budzinski 2010; Christi-
ansen 2010), possibly as a result of enforcement problems.11 
Figure 1: Types of Intervention; Share in all Interventions 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data by the European Commission (August 4, 
2012 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf)12 
The relation between the different methods of intervention and the total number 
of interventions provides interesting evidence concerning the question whether the 
EC uses deals, i.e., consensual agreements with companies, more frequently. This is 
illustrated by figure 1. While the share of prohibitions in all interventions decreased 
to virtually zero and also the share of the phase II obligation decisions has clearly 
been decreasing from 2006 to 2011 (from 31.6 per cent in 2006 to 14.3 percent in 
2011 with an all-time low of 12.5 per cent in 2010), the share of the phase I ap-
provals including company commitments has been significantly increasing and con-
stituted 70-80 per cent of all interventions in the last five years. In this type of in-
tervention the EC typically draws on commitment offers by the merging companies 
without submitting them to essential modifications. 
Also even in cases where the EC inflicted obligations after an intense phase II exam-
ination these obligations have, however, frequently emerged from intense negotia-
tions with the companies in question. An analysis of 22 phase II decisions of the 
type ‘approval with obligations’ since summer 2006 shows that the imposed reme-
dies are primarily based on a negotiation process between the commission and the 

11 Theoretically, the decreasing number of prohibition and phase-II commitment cases could also be 
explained by an improved anticipation of EC merger control by merging companies, thus design-
ing merger projects in a way compatible with European merger control and not undertaking 
such that would lead to a prohibition. However, Budzinski (2010: 451-455) shows that numerous 
indications actually hints at enforcement problems. 
12 Here, data is lacking for 1990 because no intervention (phase I, II or prohibition) took place.
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merging companies.13 The strategy applied thereby typically includes the EC seeking 
so-called ‘remedy submissions’ at the merging companies. These suggestions or 
suggested remedies are then examined with a so-called ‘market test’. The test re-
sults are then feedbacked to the companies in partially very intense discussion fo-
rums whereupon the merging partners get the opportunity to suggest modified 
remedies. The process can last for several rounds. In the cases of Inco/Falconbridge, 
Universal/BMG, SFR/Tele 2 and Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, for instance, it took four 
such rounds each after the first remedy suggestions were submitted by the compa-
nies. The sample mentioned above contains 2.45 negotiation rounds on average; 
this number, however, is only of limited information value because the intensity of 
the remedy negotiations differs from round to round. In the cases of T-Mobile Aus-
tria/Tele.Ring, Inco/Falconbridge, SFR/Tele 2, Thomson/Reuters and 
Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, for example, particularly intense negotiations between 
EC and companies took place concerning the question of how to reach permission 
for the merger. 
Furthermore, it can be established that the EC adopts the companies’ competitively 
doubtful lines of argument at least sometimes. A recent example to substantiate 
this claim is the merger case of Oracle/Sun (Buhr et al. 2011; Vezzoso 2011, also for 
the following remarks).14 The merger of those two software companies in summer 
2009 led to objections concerning the market for data software, particularly be-
cause the open source competitor MySQL became Oracle's property due to the 
merger. According to experts and the EC, MySQL is a so-called 'maverick', i.e., an 
outside competitor putting exceptional competitive pressure on the established and 
market-leading suppliers through special innovative activity and a distinct business 
model. Additionally, Oracle will experience strong incentives to considerably reduce 
the development of this alternative business model after the merger and to effec-
tively abandon it in the medium run. Yet, the EC finally approved the merger in No-
vember 2009 without imposing any remedies. This decision was made after the EC 
considered a non-binding public promise by Oracle sufficient to mitigate the anti-
competitive concerns. Oracle promised to fully and dynamically maintain MySQL as 
an innovative maverick competitor. The EC thereby adopted Oracle's view that a 
violation of the non-binding public promise would imply a considerable loss of 

13 Referring to the cases Omya/Huber, Dong/Elsam/Energi E2, T-Mobile Austria/Tele.Ring, Inco/ Fal-
conbridge, Gaz de France/Suez, Metso/Aker Kvaerner, JCI/Fiamm, Universal/BMG, SFR/Tele 2, 
Arjowiggins/M-Real Zanders, Kronospan/Constantia, Thomson/Reuters, Statoilhydro/Conoco Phil-
lips, Friesland/Campina, ABF/GBI, Arsenal/DSP, Lufthansa/SN, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, Unile-
ver/Sara Lee, Syngenta/Monsanto Sunflower, Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies, 
J&J/Synthes and Südzucker/ED&F MAN. Except for the last three cases the detailed substantia-
tions for the EC’s decision were taken as a basis. Since these are not yet present for the last three 
cases press releases by the EC were used here. 
14 An older case in this category is the Newscorp/Telepíu merger of 2003 in which the EC approved 
the merger on the back of a financial restructuring defense. Curiously, however, the buying 
company represented the one in danger of running insolvency (and not the target of the takeo-
ver). See Budzinski (2009: 347-350). 
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reputation for Oracle, which would significantly harm Oracle's complete software 
business (!). Apart from the problem that it can hardly be controlled in detail 
whether Oracle really continues to develop open source MySQL as a competitor 
would do, the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism appears to be rather 
questionable. Already at the time of the merger control procedure, Oracle was stra-
tegically cutting back other sections of open source, such as the corresponding So-
laris version, in particular after its takeover of Sun Microsystems (Vezzoso 2011: 
18).15 
Basically, the indication suggests that the EC aims at preventing merger prohibi-
tions. Instead, the EC uses intense negotiations to modify merger plans so that the 
essential competition concerns are alleviated. While doing so, the commission ob-
viously places great value on cooperation with and on the view of the merging 
companies. In connection to phase II decisions the EC - in correspondence with the 
market actors - often creatively intervenes severely into the structure of the affected 
markets, actively altering existing and creating new market structures and charac-
teristics (for example in the cases of Gaz de France/Suez, ABF/GBI, Fries-
land/Campina or Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines). In the case of Thomson/Reuters, the 
EC – jointly with merging companies – designed and imposed complex remedies 
aiming at the reconstitution of the pre-merger competitive situation by the (artifi-
cial) entrance of new competitors. Similarly, in the case of ABF/GBI the EC negotiat-
ed and applied comprehensive and highly constructive remedies to restore the pre-
merger triple oligopoly structure.16 
An ostensibly surprising success of disintegration which was achieved by the EC in 
relation to power grids could be linked to a particular deal. At the end of February 
2008 the commission achieved an agreement with E.ON. The company ‘voluntarily’ 
agreed to sell a part of its power grid to enhance the competition on the electricity 
market. This agreement turned out to be the initiation of a vertical disintegration of 
European electricity markets. According to consistent press reports, the arrange-
ment between E.ON and the EC has not only surprised the public but also national 
politicians – and includes a sudden and complete u-turn of E.ON's position and 
company policy. Hence, immediate speculations arose what motivated E.ON to 
consent to the deal so surprisingly and abruptly, especially since this move massive-
ly weakened the negotiating position of the whole sector towards the EC and the 
regulating authorities in Europe. One of the most prominent speculations suspects 
the EC of having offered to stop two antitrust proceedings concerning offenses 

15 The most recent decision concerning the Unilever/Sara Lee merger could be another example in 
this sense. However, a detailed explanation of the decision has not yet been published (as of 
March 5, 2011).
16 The question must be asked whether a restoration or preservation of the pre-merger structural 
competition situation would not be achieved more efficiently and with less intensity of interven-
tion (simply) through a prohibition of the merger in question. 
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against the Art. 101 and 102 TFEU as its part of the deal – in spite of an excellent 
state of evidence.17 The ‘particularity’ of such a ‘deal’ consists in the fact that sever-
al political sectors of competition and regulation are linked to each other in a deal 
between competition authority and companies (‘cross-policy deal’). 
 
3. Economic Analysis of ‘Deal Policies’: The Economics of Consensual Ar-
rangements 
The pros and cons of voluntary approaches or consensual arrangements have been 
discussed in several subjects within economics as well as in other disciplines. For 
example, in the late 1990s, there has been a vital discussion of so-called voluntary 
approaches in environmental policy, referring to consensual arrangements about 
environmental policy goals and instruments between major industries and govern-
ments, replacing or preempting public regulatory initiatives.18 Similarly discussions 
took place in agricultural economics19 and electricity economics20. After having 
identified traces of a trend towards consensual arrangements between the Europe-
an competition authority and its norm addressees in the preceding sections, we 
now discuss the advantages and disadvantages of ‘deals’ from an economic per-
spective. We identify (I) asymmetric information, (II) transparency, accessibility and 
discrimination, (III) acceptance and costs, as well as (IV) the political economics of 
competition agencies as relevant areas where pros and cons of deal policies are 
displayed. 
 
3.1. Asymmetric Information 
Competition policy is characterized by considerable information asymmetries. Typi-
cally, companies have more and better information on the relevant market on their 
own behavior, products and situation at their disposal than the competition au-
thority in charge. This insider knowledge cannot be completely accessed by the 
competition authority, offering scope for a strategic use of the information ad-
vantage by the norm addressees. This is further aggravated by the fact that the 
competition authority must to some extent rely on market information provided by 

17 Tagesschau online (March 7, 2011 <http://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/eon30.html>) reports: 
“Exactly these structural changes [sale of power grids] are intended to be introduced by E.ON 
with the sale of high-tension power lines – in reverse, the competition authority of Brussels ex-
amines a cessation of the cartel proceedings. In Brussels, nobody remembers a deal of a similar 
dimension.“ [transl.] See also, for instance, New York Times from February 28, 2008. 
18 See inter alia, Rennings et al. 1997; Mazurek 1998; Carraro & Lévêque 1999; OECD 1999, Sullivan 
2005 and Quandt 2010. 
19 See e. g. Schulze 1994. 
20 See e. g. Canadian Electricity Association 1996.
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the norm addressees when doing its competitive assessment.21 An additionally con-
tributing factor in merger control is that the companies have already intensively 
dealt with the issue when they notify a merger. This circumstance can be regarded 
as particularly relevant during phase I proceedings in the European context because 
they are ‘rash’ decisions without a thorough examination by the competition au-
thority. This means that companies enjoy a considerable scope to use their infor-
mation advantages in this phase. 
Consensual arrangements may be viewed as an instrument to alleviate the problem 
of asymmetric information to the extent that they offer incentives to the norm ad-
dressees to reveal unbiased information. Within the context of European competi-
tion policy, in particular two areas of advantages can be identified for this kind of 
deals: 
- Remedies in merger control and abuse control: Due to their superior knowledge 
about the relevant markets, companies are able to propose more efficient and 
more effective remedies to competitive concerns than the competition authori-
ty. 
- Inability to pay problem: in cartel proceedings, a consensual arrangement of 
the fine among cartel delinquents and the competition authority may prevent 
companies from facing insolvency due to the cartel sanction (Kienapfel & Wils 
2011). 
On the downside, this information may be strategically biased and distorted. The 
norm addressees routinely experience incentives to propose ineffective remedies if 
they benefit from the anticompetitive arrangement or conduct. The latter is virtual-
ly always the case when it comes to abuse control. In case of mergers it depends on 
the significance of the competitive concern for the overall business of the new enti-
ty. Ineffective remedies, more precisely, means remedies that do not effectively al-
leviate the competitive concern and/or, at the same time, are difficult to assess and 

21 The extent of information asymmetries may vary. To what extent the competition authority in 
charge already treated and decided cases in a certain industry or sector is a question to be con-
sidered here. In ‘new’ cases the experience and the knowledge of the cartel authority may be lim-
ited and the information asymmetries are stronger than in markets which have already been sub-
ject to comprehensive and in-depth investigations by the competition authorities before. In 2004 
for instance, the Federal Cartel Office of Germany dealt with a merger of hospitals for the first 
time (Kuchinke & Kallfass 2006). Thus, it was important for the authority to firstly acquire 
knowledge about the special characteristics of this industry and the relevant markets in question. 
With the occurrence of more cases in the following years, the accordingly increased experience 
and knowledge of the cartel office reflects in a (from a health economics point of view) improved 
quality of the merger control decisions in this industry. Numerous health-economic aspects are 
better understood now and the later decisions are theoretically more profound and clarified due 
to a decrease of information asymmetries. 


15 

supervise by the competition authorities. For instance, remedies whose implemen-
tation and/or effects are virtually impossible to monitor and supervise after their 
imposition through the competition authority perfectly fit the interests of the norm 
addressees. In particular, complex remedies may additionally be suited to hide their 
lack of effectiveness and/or enforceability to the authorities. Thus, it may not be 
accidental that especially remedies in merger control appear to increase in complex-
ity with the increasing involvement of the merging companies in the remedy-
finding process. Similarly, it may be difficult to monitor and supervise whether car-
tel members really face an inability-to-pay problem when confronted with the car-
tel fine and consecutive charges. 22  Quite unambiguously, any convicted cartel 
member will be wanting to reduce the fine as much as possible. 
It needs to be kept in mind that a rational company will only engage in a deal with 
the competition authority if it receives a benefit in comparison to the unilateral rule 
execution by the authority. This implies that any voluntary information offering in 
the course of a deal negotiation must contribute to a strategic benefit. Such a ben-
efit can be (i) achieving the same level of competition by more efficient remedies, 
(ii) achieving less effective remedies and benefiting from continuing anticompeti-
tive rents or (iii) creating trust from the authority (information offer as a signaling 
device) which may yield benefits in other areas (like perhaps in the E.ON deal). 
While (i) would involve unbiased but strategically incomplete information (infor-
mation hinting at additional, so far undetected anticompetitive concerns will not 
be disclosed) and be beneficial in welfare terms, (ii) would involve biased infor-
mation and is clearly welfare-reducing. And (iii) is most probably also welfare-
reducing even though it may involve rather unbiased (but probably incomplete) 
information disclosure. 
Even if possibility one is viewed to be of empirical relevance23, a sensitive question 
is whether competition authorities can reliably discriminate between (i) and (ii). 
This basically refers to the competence of the competition authority to assess and 
evaluate the quality and the accuracy of the information offered by the norm ad-
dressees. Firstly, the competition authority can employ its own economic expertise, 
for instance in terms of using calibrated models of the relevant markets to assess 
the plausibility of the companies’ information (Budzinski & Ruhmer 2010). The Eu-
ropean Commission – as well as many other European antitrust agencies – has con-
siderably increased the number of (industrial) economists in its staff during the last 

22 Public cartel fines imposed by competition authorities are usually followed-up by private damage 
claims by the victims of the excessive cartel prices. The often unclear number of victims, the 
lengthy nature of the proceedings as well as national peculiarities like the triple damage principle 
in the U.S. contribute to the virtual impossibility of seriously assessing the total financial burden 
on a cartel convict at the time of issuing the fine. These factors further increase information 
asymmetries since the company in question will have superior information on prospective follow-
up claims than the competition authority. 
23 We are not aware of any study providing empirical information on this topic. 
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decade and implemented a chief economist office, headed by a renowned econo-
mist (Röller & Buigues 2005).24 In addition to this inhouse competence, the Com-
mission frequently relies on expertise of external and independent economists. Sec-
ondly, information from insiders with contrary interests – competitors, suppliers 
and consumers of the investigated parties – help to evaluate the received insider 
information by balancing out oppositional biases. Thirdly, the competition authori-
ty can monitor remedies and - depending on the legal order – may re-intervene if 
the consensually arranged remedies fail to live up to their promises. However, the 
legal scope for this is rather limited in Europe and there are several practical diffi-
culties (e.g. identification of failures in case of complex remedies, high costs of ex 
post unbundling, etc.). Fourthly, systematic ex post evaluation of competition poli-
cy decisions may help to improve future decisions (Davies & Ormosi 2010; Budzinski 
2011b) – even though they cannot correct wrong decisions of the past. These in-
struments lessen the extent of strategic behavior due to information asymmetries. 
Notwithstanding, they still leave considerable scope for the norm addressees to use 
their information advantage in an anticompetitive sense. 
 
3.2. Transparency, Accessibility, and Discrimination 
Transparency and accessibility are notorious problems when it comes to consensual 
arrangements. Firstly, deals usually take place in secrecy and details about the set-
tlement process and the result of the deals are usually not published. For instance, 
it is an explicit element of the new cartel sanction settlement practice in European 
competition policy that details about the deal and the underlying competition law 
violation are kept secret among the arrangement parties as part of the deal. Sec-
ondly, participation in the consensual arrangements is usually not comprehensive, 
i.e. some parties that are affected by the deal are not part of the negotiations and 
the arrangement. While competitors and/or industrial suppliers and customers 
sometimes are part of the deal and sometimes not, consumers most typically are 
not and have to rely of the competition authority advocating their interest instead. 
Although the latter should be viewed to be the task of the competition authority, 
the economics of bureaucracy point to a related principal-agent problem and, thus, 
to the self-interest of the authority (see in more detail section 3.4). If the self-
interest of the competition authority trumps its consumer’s advocate role and/or if 
other affected parties are not part of the deal, arrangements at the expense of 
third parties (customers, consumers, small- and middle-sized businesses, companies 
from outside Europe, the general public, etc.) are likely to result. Like with lobby-
ism, in particular parties consisting of many heterogeneous individuals or units are 

24 The position is currently held by Kai-Uwe Kühn (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/ 
role_en.html; accessed 19.07.2012), successing Lars-Hendrik Röller and Damien Neven. 
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likely to get discriminated due to their comparatively low degree of ability to or-
ganize powerful influence groups (Olson 1965).25 
The non-disclosure of evidence against cartels as part of the settlement deal among 
the EC and cartel members offers a telling example since the non-availability of this 
evidence to deal-outsiders considerably complicates and handicaps the legal en-
forcement of private damage claims of these deal outsiders. Both the statement of 
objections and the final decision are significantly shortened whereby less infor-
mation about the cartel is published (Dekeyser & Roques 2010: 830-831, 838).26 
Thus, outsiders receive considerably less information about the damaging effects of 
the cartel or the accrued welfare losses (Holmes & Girardet 2011: 8). The settlement 
procedure itself even remains completely confidential so that the public cannot un-
derstand, for instance, in how far the EC approached the companies or which party 
accepted the compromise. Thereby, it is explicitly possible that certain incriminating 
investigative results regarding the consensual arrangements do not become known 
to the public at all. According to Dekeyser & Roques (2010: 830-831, 838), this 
constitutes a significant part of the incentives for cartelizing companies to partici-
pate in the settlements. 
Furthermore, the EC provides some kind of ‘advance payment’ during such negotia-
tions since it discloses its evidence and the cartelizing companies are granted access 
to the state of the investigation right from the beginning, even before an agree-
ment is conceivable (Dekeyser & Roques 2010: 835). Since this information cannot 
be retracted if the settlement negotiations fail, cartel members may use the infor-
mation from the failed negotiations to advance and arm their defense against a 
(non-consensual) EC decision. 
The secrecy element of the (successful) settlement deal, on the other hand, causes 
negative side effects on the follow-up private damage claim suits. Basically, they 
must rely on the facts which have been detected by the federal investigation since 
private persons do not have the investigative power and means to detect and pro-
duce their own evidence against the cartel. Thus, the fewer information are availa-
ble the harder it is for the victims of the cartel to receive compensation through 
private enforcement (Holmes & Girardet 2011: 7-8). This is problematic from an 
economic point of view because, in addition to the public sentence, the impending 
compensation claims represent an essential deterrence element with regard to the 

25 Size and importance of companies may matter in terms of influencing the shape of a deal. It may 
be speculated, for instance, whether merger projects by comparatively small airlines (e.g. Olym-
pic/Aegean Airlines and Ryanair/Air Lingus) were, inter alia, prohibited because their deal lobby 
was not as strong as in cases of bigger airlines (Lufthansa/SN and particularly Lufthansa/Austrian 
Airlines) that managed to get a conditional clearance with consensually arranged remedies. 
26 This does not, however, simply apply to the negotiation of remedies in merger control decisions. 
In this case, the commission publishes a detailed reasoning which at least offers limited insights 
into the negotiation process. 
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participation in illegal cartels (Rüggeberg & Schinkel 2006; Truli 2009; Lande & Da-
vies 2010).27 Similarly, the prosecution of the cartel in question in other jurisdic-
tions that have experienced damages from the cartel is impeded. This particularly 
hurts small and less-developed jurisdictions which lack the investigative power and 
financial means to enforce competition rules of the EU or the U.S. (and therefore 
rely on their findings) and are often a prime target of international cartels (again 
‘deals at the expense of third parties’).28 
Again, instruments such as the detailed publication of consensual arrangements 
and the systematic evaluation of past competition policy decisions can ex post con-
tribute to the mitigation of problems. From an economic perspective, however, it 
must be considered that both parties – companies and competition authorities – 
experience a strong common interest to sell any done deal as being a success. The 
competition authority in particular will have little incentive to harm its own reputa-
tion through a negative ex post evaluation of the deal. 
In the literature on consensual arrangements in environmental policy, a proposed 
solution to the problem of accessibility and discrimination is represented by the 
roundtable idea of bringing all affected interests together to ensure that all legiti-
mate interests are represented in the final deal. Apart from obvious organizational 
problems (organizing dispersed interests, decreasing probability of achieving con-
sensus with the increasing number of diverse interests, identification of all affected 
parties, etc.), however, we should keep in mind that we are talking about competi-
tion policy here, i.e. a policy seeking to protect the coordination mechanism com-
petition from being replaced by inter-company coordination or monopolistic struc-
tures. Calling for a remedy deal in a merger case that is comprehensive (i.e. in-
cludes all affected parties in a roundtable decision) obviously violates the funda-
mental goal of this policy since it represents an – indeed comprehensive! – re-
placement of competition as a coordination mechanism in itself. The same is true 
for cartel and market power abuse cases. Thus, making deals even more compre-
hensive most clearly does not represent a sensible strategy in the name of the pro-
tection of competition. 

27 In their analysis of the optimal fine discount for settlements, Ascione and Motta (2010: 75) argue 
that “[s]ettlements may affect firms’ exposure to private litigation by accelerating the initiation 
of such actions, and by making them more likely.” However, this ignores that settlements also 
considerably reduce the quantity and quality of published information about the cartel, thus sig-
nificantly aggravating (and not promoting) follow-on private damage claims. This would most 
probably significantly alter their results. Generally, it is often overlooked in the literature that an 
accelerated exposure to private damage claims due to a settlement is overcompensated by ren-
dering these follow-on suits virtually impossible because of the limitation of published infor-
mation.    
28 Dekeyser & Roques (2010: 831) even highlight this fact as an advantage: “Having the opportunity 
to limit exposure to litigation in other jurisdictions by getting to know and discuss the objections 
before the SO is issued may also be a particularly attractive benefit for parties […]”. 
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3.3. Acceptance and Cost 
One of the major advantages of consensual arrangements is their high acceptance 
level. The parties involved in the deal (the insiders) are more likely to accept and, 
therefore, ‘live’ the deal. So, consensual arrangement can be realized more effec-
tively as they rest on consent. On the other hand, it is obvious that companies stra-
tegically only offer such ‘commitments’, whose realization are not or only hardly 
controllable ex post facto – and therefore will not destroy their anticompetitive 
rents. Insofar that this is the case, acceptance is either easy (absence of potentially 
effective remedies) or merely cheap talk (absence of effectively enforceable reme-
dies). 
Another advantage of ‘deals’ might be lower costs.29 For instance, the settlement 
policy regarding cartel fines increases procedural efficiency due to the acceptance 
of the EC’s decisions by ex-cartel members (Dekeyser & Roques 2010: 828-830, also 
for the following). A couple of resource-intensive procedural steps are eliminated. 
For instance, the translation of all case documents in multiple languages can be 
omitted because the companies, as a part of the settlement, agree to that. The fact 
that in settlement cases the EC’s statement of objections is already consensually 
agreed among norm enforcer and norm addressees implies that no replies by the 
parties are to be expected and processed. Instead, oral hearings are held. Eventual-
ly, the consensual arrangement implies that both the statement of objections and 
the final decisions can be written significantly shorter and more streamlined be-
cause appeals are unlikely. Thus, the risk of lengthy and resource-intensive legal 
proceedings is minimized to virtually zero and, consequently, legal fees and proce-
dural costs can be substantially reduced as well as proceedings considerably short-
ened. 
A counter-argument is that additional resources need to be expended to operate 
and arrange the settlement negotiations. Should these costs be systematically low-
er than the procedural savings, then the net procedural effort can be reduced 
through deals.30 Such a cost reduction would be beneficial since the resources 
saved could be used to intensify the fight against anticompetitive arrangements 
and conduct, i.e. for a more efficient competition policy. 
Another significant advantage for the companies and therefore an important incen-
tive to engage in consensual settlements is the fact that potential reputational 
damage through the publication of cartel participation can be reduced to a mini-
mum or at least kept within a limit. In return for acknowledging the facts and for 
accepting the sentence the EC not only warrants a lessened sentence but also re-

29  In the law-and-economics literature, this often represents a central motivation for settlements 
(inter alia, Posner 1973, Shavell 1993, Spier 2007). 
30 Whether this is indeed the case constitutes an empirical question. Unfortunately, we are not 
aware of any empirical studies confirming net cost reductions through deals. 
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duces the amount and the extent of its publication about the cartel and about the 
unlawful actions of the involved companies (Dekeyser & Roques 2010: 830). More-
over, the cartelizing companies gain a considerable influence on the EC’s decision 
by entering into a consensual settlement arrangement. This can very well lead to 
the situation that some allegations are dropped in the course of arranging a com-
promise between the EC and the cartel members (Dekeyser & Roques 2010: 830-
831). In their settlement submissions, which the companies submit after the bilat-
eral deal negotiations with the EC, the companies acknowledge ‘only’ the facts 
which were mutually agreed upon as well as the resulting liability (and blame). 
They also indicate a maximum fine that they would accept (Dekeyser & Roques 
2010: 837-838)! 
A game-theoretic perspective on the acceptance effects of deals reveals important 
further insights. If deals occur frequently and/or deals are the results of multistage 
negotiations (as it is the case in merger control regarding phase-II remedies), then 
effects derived from the economics of repeated games apply. In repeated games, 
the players tend to build up mutual trust and a reputation for being a reliable part-
ner through the repeated interaction. According to Dekeyser & Roques (2010: 834, 
836) such a “common view through bilateral settlement discussion rounds” is an 
explicit aim of cartel settlements. In theory, this could lead to the companies inter-
nalizing competitive principles and, as a consequence of their modified norm fun-
dament, lead them to act rather procompetitively and in compliance with competi-
tion rules in the future. This internalization of competitive principles would then 
improve the deterrence effect of competition policy and, thus, the overall protec-
tion of competition. 
However, there is also a less competitive story that, unfortunately, may be more 
plausible in the real world. Through the negotiation rounds and the repeated inter-
action, it may be the competition authority which adapts and ‘internalizes’ the 
views of the companies that violate competition rules. Firstly, in the worst case, the 
authority in charge may de facto lose its independence as a regulatory body be-
cause it does not apply criteria and suggest solutions anymore but negotiates 
them.31 Secondly, as the rule content and interpretation becomes negotiable, rules 
may lose their efficiency because every deal may result in a new interpretation. This 
significantly erodes the acceptance and thus the deterrence effects of competition 
rules and competition policy.32 Thirdly, particularly in the case of big mergers of 
national interest (in the broadest sense) with supposedly strong involvement of the 
media, it can be assumed that the competition authorities attend to the interests of 

31 …with a simultaneously existing information asymmetry at the expense of the authority. 
32 Compliance to as well as public acceptance of competition rules are shaped through the serious, 
consistent, transparent and (therefore) anticipatable application of the rules (Kovacic 2010) – 
which is the core of the concept ‘rule-based competition policy’. The prospect of individual deals 
and arrangements stands in sharp contrast to this reasoning. 
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‘their’ companies more closely; a development which might result in a rather be-
nevolent assessment of merger plans compared to a purely competitive assessment. 
Eventually, the systematic application of consensual elements is likely to lead to 
multiple deals. The result is the emergence of a ‘give-and-take’ situation. In terms 
of game theory, cooperatively repeated games are likely to dominate the relation of 
norm addressees and authority. For the settlement policy with cartel members, for 
instance, it is explicitly stated that “a non-cooperative equilibrium [is substituted] 
with a dynamic, cooperative one” (Dekeyser & Roques 2010: 821). A dynamic and 
cooperative game contains consensual political solutions (‘deals’) which are in the 
common interest of both negotiating parties (competition authority and norm ad-
dressees) and inevitably provide a compromise for which both partners have to 
make concessions. Necessarily, the competition authority, thereby, at least partly 
must side with the companies’ anticompetitive interests. Moreover, both partners 
have a common interest to present their consensual arrangement as a success. 
In summary, there is vital danger that competition authorities and anticompetitive 
companies become ‘partners in crime’.33 The competition authority runs into a situ-
ation where it weighs the effects of competition with the interests of the compa-
nies, interests it increasingly shares, and against the background of the compro-
mises it has done for past deals. Accepting anticompetitive arrangements and con-
duct – instead of fighting it – then may become the daily business of the competi-
tion authority. 
Eventually, this involves a trade-off. With the increasing acceptance of the consen-
sually arranged competition policy decisions, acceptance of the competition rules 
decreases. So does also the acceptance of the general competition policy in the 
sense of deterrence of anticompetitive behavior (Polinsky & Rubinfeld 1988; 
Franzoni 1999; Edwards & Padilla 2010: 673-674; Choné et al. 2012). If anticom-
petitive companies – be they involved in a cartel, an anticompetitive merger or abu-
sive strategies – can realistically hope for a deal, then the incentive for these com-
panies increases to risk more and more anticompetitive arrangements/conduct and 
test out the rules. Since the deterrence effect of competition policy – companies 
relinquishing anticompetitive arrangement and conduct because they anticipate 
they will not get through with it – accounts for the largest part of the positive wel-
fare effect of protecting competition, this loss of acceptance of competition rules 
and their enforcement might actually be the most damaging consequence from an 
increased deal policy in the long run. 
 

33 In other words, competition authority and anticompetitive companies form a cartel. 
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3.4. The Political Economics of Competition Authorities 
From a political-economic perspective, competition authorities must be expected to 
also pursue their own interests (‘economic theory of bureaucracy’; Niskanen 1968). 
These interests can be maximizing the budget, the number of employees or the po-
litical social weight. Additionally, they also include a good public image and repu-
tation, both as a means to increase the budget and as a value on its own. For a 
competition authority, these self-interest factors can be boiled down to (i) demon-
strating activity by frequent interventions, and (ii) showcasing interventions as be-
ing a success. It should be kept in mind that in real-world agencies, the self-interest 
factors will be mixed in the utility function with ‘objective’ target factors, here: the 
protection of competition. 
Consensual arrangements offer considerable potential to serve the self-interest fac-
tors of competition authorities. Firstly, competition authorities may benefit from 
more complex regulations that significantly go beyond the ‘simple’ application of 
rules. Deals offer ample scope for increasing the complexity of regulation since 
rule-based competition policy gets more and more driven towards individual case 
handling with a high degree of intervention. For instance, merger control proceed-
ings increase in complexity when prohibition decisions and comparatively clear-cut 
divestment obligations become substituted by multistage negotiations among the 
authorities, the merging companies and maybe even their main competitors about 
the future market structure. The phase-II merger decision sample that we discuss in 
section 2.2 offers several examples where prohibition decisions (safeguarding the 
pre-merger number of competitors) was replaced by an arrangement allowing the 
merger accompanied by complex structural and behavioral interventions attempt-
ing to recreate the pre-merger structure without blocking the merger (even includ-
ing the authority-supported creation of ‘artificial’ new entry into the market). Gen-
erally, the trend towards more complex and more ‘constructive’34 interventions into 
the market structure and situation in the course of the remedy deals becomes ra-
ther obvious. The EC has gone a long way from ‘just’ being a watchdog, limiting its 
merger control interventions to preventing anticompetitive combinations towards 
being an active player in (re-)designing and configurating markets in cooperation 
with big business companies of the respective markets. While this trend fits eco-
nomic theories of regulatory authorities, it may not be welfare-maximizing. And 
certainly neither does it fit the idea of rule-based competition policy, nor the con-
cept of limiting intervention into competitive markets in order to restrict the au-
thority to the task of preventing the self-erosion of competition by anticompetitive 
arrangements and conduct. Eventually, the perspective of economic theory raises 
doubts as to whether the competition authority – with or without cooperation of 

34  ‚Constructive‘ in the sense of actively designing and moulding the new structures. 
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the industry in question – possess sufficient knowledge and competence to design 
and configurate competitive markets (Hayek 1945, 1948, 1968, 1975). 
At a first glance, however, the resource-extending effect of deals seems to stand in 
contrast to the procedural efficiency gains stated in the preceding section. And, 
indeed, deals like consensual cartel procedure settlements (and also remedy deals) 
shift the resource-intensity away from post-decision legal proceedings towards pre-
decision negotiations (deal-making). Without an empirical analysis, the net effect 
on resource-usage and, thus, on budget maximization remains unclear – and it may 
be subject to dynamic changes: it might be that an efficiency gain in the short-run 
is (over-)compensated by increasing procedure complexity in the longer-run. How-
ever, the political-economy perspective reveals that this shift serves the self-interest 
of competition authorities anyway. 
Secondly, consensual arrangements serve the reputational goal of the competition 
authority while post-decision legal proceedings do not. Post-decision legal proceed-
ings – namely, complaints and appeals of the norm addressees in front of the 
courts – are not only resource-intensive, they are also potentially image-damaging. 
Every time a court of appeal repeals decisions by the authority and/or criticizes the 
authority decision, it publicly inflicts a ‘defeat’ on the authority. In particular in the 
administration system, where the competition authority decides cases on its own 
and courts are limited to the role of being appellation bodies (like it is in European 
competition policy)35, the competition authority cannot win much by post-decision 
legal proceedings. In the best case, the authority decision is confirmed by the court, 
which, however, is often viewed to be the ‘normal’ case and does not add reputa-
tion. If the court revokes or modifies the authority decision, then this is usually 
viewed to be a defeat of the authority with negative reputation effects36. Consen-
sual arrangements, on the other hand, significantly reduce the probability of appel-
lations by the norm addressees, so that courtroom defeat becomes less likely. Fur-
thermore, the anticompetitive companies and the authority share a common inter-
est to sell their deal as a success to the public (‘partners in crime’), so that positive 
reputation effects may be reaped. That this may come at the expense of consumer 
welfare and competition will often be less public due to the dispersed character of 
the negative effect and the low organizational structure of the disadvantaged play-
ers (consumers, small businesses, taxpayers, foreign players, etc.). Therefore, the 
shifting of resources from post-decision legal proceedings towards pre-decision 
negotiations is advantageous for the agency even if total resource intensity remains 

35 This differs from the (for instance, U.S.-style) court system where the competition authority 
needs to seek a court decision and plays the role of a state attorney (see on the phenotype sys-
tems Budzinski 2009: 372-373). Note, however, that deals are also a frequent element of court 
systems (Reindl 2010; Rubinfeld 2010; Wood 2010). 
36  This stands in accordance with more general theoretical insights by Perloff et al. (1996) as well as 
with Temple Lang (2006). 
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the same, i.e. the marginal reduction of resources for post-decision legal proceed-
ings equals the marginal increase of resources for pre-decision negotiations. If the 
former is lower than the latter, then it would be optimal for the authority since 
both self-interest factors (budget maximization and reputation effects) are im-
proved. Vice versa, the total incentive effect is unclear since the disadvantage of 
reducing total resources comes with an improved reputation effect. 
The EC suffered several setbacks due to unfavorable court decisions during the last 
decade. In merger control, three prohibitions in a row as well as one clearance de-
cision were revoked, including outspoken criticism of the EC’s practices and deci-
sion quality through the judges.37 Along with unfavorable media coverage, this put 
considerable pressure on the EC and certainly was perceived to harm the EC’s repu-
tation as a competition authority. Additionally, implicitly and unintentionally in-
creased thresholds for evidence in the context of new economic investigation tech-
niques de facto weakened the EC’s position in court (Budzinski 2010). Altogether, 
therefore, the enhanced tendency towards consensual arrangements may actually 
reflect the EC’s desire to save its reputation despite its weakened position of power. 
Then, the remedy deal policy may be viewed as a second-best policy by the EC, at-
tempting to maintain its reputation in the face of ‘objective’ enforcement problems 
in merger control (Budzinski 2010) without completely giving up on its competition 
protecting goals. However, such a view ignores existing alternatives to the avenue 
of consensual arrangements – alternatives that admittedly would involve a more 
rule-based and less complex-interventionist approach and, thus, may demand few-
er resources.38 
Regarding cartel sanctions, the EC has made similar experiences. Though EC deci-
sions on cartels have not been revoked, there have been several cases where the 
cartel fine imposed by the EC has been considerably reduced by the appellation 
bodies. Furthermore, evidentiary thresholds have become more ambitious when it 
comes to calculating the appropriate fine. Consequently, the consensual settlement 
arrangements comprising agreement on the facts of the case as well as on the ap-
propriate fine may pay off a double dividend for the EC. Firstly, although the cartel-
izing companies formally keep the right to do so, they tend to be less likely to re-
peal the EC’s decision. Secondly, even in case of an appeal, the position of the EC in 
court is considerably improved because the companies accepted the facts of the 
case and the fine beforehand (Dekeyser & Roques 2010: 829-830). 

37 See the cases Tetra Laval/Sidel, Schneider/Legrand, and Airtours/First Choice (all: Christiansen 
2010) as well as Sony/BMG (Aigner et al. 2007). Additionally, the court – even though confirming 
the prohibition decision – heavily criticized the EC in the case GE/Honeywell (Baxter et al. 2006). 
38 Focusing on strong and economics-based ‚rebuttable presumptions‘ represents one such alterna-
tive (Baker & Shapiro 2008; Farrell & Shapiro 2008; Budzinski 2010: 466-471) 
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In summary, consensual arrangements are well-suited to the self-interest of compe-
tition authorities, in particular if the threat of unfavorable court decisions is preva-
lent. Thus, if a competition authority does not act completely altruistic and unself-
ish, it should be prone to enter such arrangements. An institutional consequence 
would be to institutionally limit the scope for the competition authority to go for 
deals, for instance by pinning down a more rule-based competition policy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
European competition policy seems to be on its way towards a political bargains-
driven case-by-case approach rather than a rule-based policy, which aims at pro-
tecting competition. Non-competition reasoning and goals play an increasing role 
in this realigned competition policy. Deals sealed between competition authorities 
and infringing companies represent an expression of this policy. Consensual ar-
rangements as an instrument of competition policy have been analyzed and evalu-
ated regarding their pros and cons in this paper from an economics perspective. 
The analysis supports some of of the claimed benefits like procedural efficiency 
gains of efficiency through minimizing appellation procedures. Furthermore, deals 
fit in with the self-interest of competition authorities, in particular when facing en-
forcement problems in front of the law courts. 
However, on the downside, consensual arrangements always imply a reduction of 
the protection of competition compared to non-cooperatively executed competi-
tion laws. If there was nothing to gain for the infringing norm addressees, it would 
not make sense to them to participate in the deal. Therefore, consensual arrange-
ments may only deliver a net benefit in the face of severe enforcement problems. If 
a competition authority is rarely able to execute the competition laws, perhaps due 
to institutional flaws, then going for consensual arrangements may represent some 
kind of a second best policy to maintain some level of competition. However, if a 
competition authority faces severe enforcement problems, it also weakens its bar-
gaining power, implying that the protection of competition will be more compro-
mised in the consensus equilibrium. Add to that information asymmetries as well as 
the partners-in-crime effect and the prospects for a constrained welfare-optimizing 
second-best policy vanish. This scepticism is reinforced by the availability of alterna-
tives to deal with experienced enforcement problems (see section 3.4.). Further-
more, empirical studies about the effectiveness and efficiency of remedies in 
merger control confirm that complex concession arrangements underperform 
(European Commission 2005; Seldeslachts et al. 2009). According to these studies, 
merely prohibitions represent an effective instrument both with regard to the pro-
tection of competition and particularly with reference to the deterrence effect of 
competition policy (frustrating anticompetitive arrangements and conduct). 
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With respect to European competition policy, we need to issue a note of caution. 
As long as consensual arrangements do not play a considerable role and, conse-
quently, do not display substantial effects, the weakening of competition will be 
marginal. Even though we found indication that consensual arrangements play a 
role and an increasing one, this does not imply that European competition policy is 
predominantly characterized by deals. However, from an economic perspective, it 
must also be noted that an expansion of consensual elements39 necessarily walks 
hand in hand with a continual weakening of the protection of competition. Con-
sumer welfare will not benefit from expanding the role and importance of consen-
sual arrangements as a means of European competition policy. Therefore, we think 
that any extension of consensual arrangements in European competition policy 
should be met with skepticism and caution. Instead, we recommend to consider a 
more rule-based competition policy approach well grounded in economic theory. In 
contrast to recent trends, however, the insights from economics should be codified 
into rules (Breyer 2009) that subsequently can be applied without offering scope 
for deals and consensual arrangements driven by the politics and interests of the 
day. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Share of Phase-I-Clearances-with-Commitments from all Decisions 
 
Source:  own illustration based on data by the European Commission (August 4, 
2012 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf>) 
 
Appendix 2: Share of Phase-II-Clearances-under-Obligations from all Decisions 
 
Source:  own illustration based on data by the European Commission (August 4, 
2012 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf>) 
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Appendix 3: Share of Prohibitions from all Decisions 
 
Source:  own illustration based on data by the European Commission (August 4, 
2012 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf>) 
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